Jack
Abramoff 's describing himself as “America's
Most Notorious Lobbyist” was clever bait, and no doubt sold more
copies
of his memoir than had its cover instead whined “Victim of Dirty
Rotten System.” It garnered more Amazon customer reviews than all
the other serious books on Washington lobbying combined. I was
looking for such a book, but I didn't take Abramoff's bait.
As
I started reading The
Lobbyists
it struck me I might be scratching a dangerous itch, exploring a
question of the sort that had occupied my aviator father whenever he
learned of an airplane crash:
was it caused by mechanical failure or pilot error? I don't believe
he ever explained the significance of this difference to me in so
many words. I was a boy, but I wonder now if he was sure he could
explain it satisfactorily even to himself. It boiled down to control,
I believe. Flying was as close to a religion as my father ever came.
Flying itself had to be safe, with as few elements left to chance as
possible. The burden fell almost entirely on the pilot to manage the
aircraft. If the pilot didn't do his job, he said, the plane “will
fly like a piano.” The faith part was twofold—the pilot had to
believe he was doing everything right, and he had to trust that his
airplane would not without actionable warning turn into a piano.
Reading
The
Lobbyists
I began to understand Jack Abramoff's appeal to so many as villain,
not victim. Because he is right. The corruption he blames is thorough
and entrenched. So much easier to impute one whose luck ran out than
to admit our government is flying like a piano. But this is what then
Wall
Street Journal
reporter Jeffrey Birnbaum forces us to do. The
Lobbyists
is framed around an account of one of the nation's toughest budget
fights, pitting a new president's “read my lips:
no new taxes” campaign pledge against our government's worst ever
fiscal deficit. Birnbaum spent over three years doing research and
interviews, including a year embedded with some of the nation's most
powerful lobbyists. His report reads like suspense fiction. The
reality of what happened heightens its drama but brings a
disheartening prospect. He delivers this blunt conclusion at the
starting gate:
Washington
has become a club in which the line between those inside and those
outside the government is not clearly drawn. Corporate lobbyists have
so suffused the culture of the city that at times they seem to be
part of the government itself. One result is that corporate America,
once a perennial sacrificial lamb when it came to government
crackdowns, has become something of a sacred cow. Not only are
lawmakers and policymakers reluctant to make changes that would hurt
businesses, they even have a tendency to try to help them, as long as
budgetary pressures do not interfere. In 1990, Congress passed, and
President Bush signed, the biggest deficit-reduction bill ever. But
of its approximately $140 billion in tax increases over five years,
only 11 percent came from corporations. The rest came from
individual, taxpaying families.
Let
me repeat those last two sentences for emphasis:
“...of
its approximately $140 billion in tax increases over five years, only
11 percent came from corporations. The rest came from individual,
taxpaying families. This
disparity hardly seems new, at least as it plays in
our current presidential primary rhetoric. But back then it cost Bush
a second term as president. Pundits cited the Clinton campaign's
in-house slogan “It's the economy, stupid,” as a reflection of
the popular anger toward Bush's presidency and its knuckling under to
corporate lobbyists. Clinton capitalized on this anger:
Public
awareness of— and disdain for— lobbyists reached a new height
with the presidential campaign of 1992. Ross Perot never tired of
bashing “alligator-shoed” lobbyists. And Bill Clinton quickly
copied him with his own brand of populism. In his acceptance speech
at the Democratic National Convention, candidate Clinton said of
President Bush, he “won’t break the stranglehold the special
interests have on our elections and the lobbyists have on our
government. But I will.” Influence peddlers, and the special
interests they represented, came to symbolize everything that was
wrong with Washington, and Clinton’s election confirmed that the
public wanted the system to change.
And
Clinton acted on his pledge, imposing new lobbying bans in his
administration and pushing new restrictive legislation. But the bans
were “riddled with loopholes and affected few people. Experts
agreed that lobbying would remain a potent force. The 'stranglehold'
of lobbyists would not be broken by President Clinton or anyone
else.” Clinton knew this as well:
...despite
the president’s populist rhetoric and legislation, he continued to
work closely with lobbyists. One of the most important functions in
the White House was to coordinate the support of lobbyists and their
clients on behalf of the Clinton policies. There was a whole
department devoted to the purpose. Clinton himself reached into the
ranks of lobbyists to populate his administration. The top White
House lobbyist, Howard Paster, was once a top corporate lobbyist; and
several members of the cabinet, including Commerce Secretary Ronald
Brown and Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, were also professional
lobbyists.
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum |
A
dizzying cast of characters populates The
Lobbyists
besides the professional influence peddlers of its focus. Most
dismaying to me was recognizing among them many names of former
government officials and high-ranking staff in both Congress and the
Executive Branch. Even former members of Congress were representing
corporate interests in the lawmaking process. It was sometimes hard
to keep them straight—in the government or working as lobbyists,
with some occasionally going from public to private payroll and then
back to public. Many government staffers freely admitted they put in
a few public years becoming marketable before turning to lobbying to
make serious money selling their name and access to former government
employers.
Birnbaum
avoids the hyperventilating
tone of an exposé,
presenting his details for the most part with the practiced poker
face of a veteran newsman. He leaves it for us to respond with gasps
at the unmistakable role the almighty dollar plays in this
all-important game—the obligatory campaign fund-raising, speaking
honoraria, gifts, free lunches and dinners, and all-expenses-paid
trips and getaways for members of Congress and their families. All
are technically legal, for the most part, according to laws the
lawmakers themselves make. It's a technicality everyone involved, of
course, hates to see celebrated in the news and on social media,
especially during an election year. More prudent to shift the ignominy
onto a hapless scapegoat like Jack Abramoff.